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To suppose that any increased issues of the [Cen-
tral] Bank can have the effect of permanently
lowering the rate of interest . . . is to attribute a
power to the circulating medium which it can
never possess.
David Ricardo, 1811
I must confess my amazement at finding people
censure or praise the [Central] Bank for making
the rate of interest high or low, when the Bank
has no possible power to make it the one or the
other.
John C. Hubbard, 1857
. . . the rate of interest . . . is determined by the
general conditions of demand and supply of real
capital; these lie outside the Central or any other
Bank’s control . . .
A. C. Pigou, 1927
. . . monetary policy . . . cannot peg interest rates
for more than very limited periods . . .
Milton Friedman, 1968
Among the more contentious issues in the con-
tinuing debate over monetary policy is the central
bank’s ability permanently to peg real interest rates.
Does the central bank really possess the power to
maintain rates indefinitely at any arbitrary level it
chooses? Or  is the real rate basically determined by
nonmonetary factors such that attempts to hold it
below its equilibrium level via excessive monetary
growth will simply result in higher rates of inflation
and so higher nominal interest rates leaving the real
rate undisturbed?
The foregoing questions are no doubt familiar to
students of recent and current monetary policy. Not
so well-known, perhaps, is what earlier generations of
monetary scholars had to say about the feasibility of
interest-pegging policies. In an effort partially to
offset this deficiency and provide historical perspec-
tive, this article examines the opinion of leading
classical ( 1750-1870) and neoclassical (1870-1936)
economists regarding the ability of central banks to
control (real) interest rates. It shows that the
notion of interest rate pegging had already been
thoroughly criticized and largely discredited by the
early 1800s. Before doing so, however, it sketches
the basic outlines of the classical/neoclassical view
in order to demonstrate how individual writers con-
tributed to it.
Essentials of the Classical/Neoclassical View
Essentially the position of the classical and neo-
classical schools was that (real) rate pegging is im-
possible.
1 Like modern monetarists, they contended
that the central bank was largely powerless to per-
manently lower market interest rates and that its
attempts to do so would merely raise prices. This
conclusion derived from the classical notion that
interest rates are basically determined by productivity
and thrift-or more precisely by the marginal pro-
ductivity of capital and society’s rate of time prefer-
ence.
2 Since monetary expansion does not affect
these real determinants, it cannot permanently alter
interest rates. To be sure, classical and neoclassical
writers recognized that the monetary authority could
temporarily lower its own loan (discount) rate,
thereby generating a gap between the latter rate and
the going rate of profit on capital (the equilibrium
rate of interest). But they argued that this gap
inevitably produces price increases that force the
bank rate back into equality with the equilibrium
1 With the notable exceptions of Thornton, Marshall, and
Fisher, classical and neoclassical writers typically did not
distinguish between real and nominal interest rates. They
implicitly assumed the expected rate of inflation to be
zero so that the two rates were one and the same.
2 On classical/neoclassical interest theory see Patinkin
[12, pp. 366-72, 630-33].
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former rate.
As for the mechanism or channels through which
this reaction occurs, classical/neoclassical economists
specified two, both involving the demand for and
supply of loanable funds and both assuming that new
money enters the economy through the loan market.
According to the first, a rise in the money supply
temporarily depresses loan rates via an expansion in
loan supply. At the same time, the monetary increase
generates an excess aggregate demand for goods in
the commodity market and so raises prices. And
since with rising prices more loans are required to
finance a given real quantity of business investment
projects, it follows that loan demands increase. As-
suming prices rise in proportion to the money stock,
loan demands would rise in proportion to loan supply,
thereby restoring loan rates to their original level,
the going profit rate on capital. According to the
second mechanism, this effect works chiefly through
loan supply. In particular, as prices rise, more cash
is needed for hand-to-hand circulation. There occurs
a cash drain from the banks that diminishes bank re-
serves. To protect reserves from depletion, banks
(including the central bank) raise their loan rates, or
what is the same thing, contract their loan supply.
Either way the result is the same: interest rates
return to their former level and only prices change.
Since this self-correcting mechanism works auto-
matically to restore real yields to their equilibrium
level, it follows that the central bank is powerless to
peg those rates.
Classical/neoclassical monetary theorists recog-
nized only one situation in which the central bank
could permanently lower real interest rates. This was
the famous “forced saving” case in which inflationary
monetary policy could, because of a lag in the adjust-
ment of wages to prices, transfer real income from
labor to capital thereby encouraging fixed capital
investment. The resulting higher rate of capital
formation lowers the marginal productivity of capital
and thus lowers equilibrium interest rates. This case,
however, was treated as a mere curiosum, a minor
exception to the rule that central banks are incapable
of permanently influencing interest rates. For the
most part,  classical  and neoclassical writers stressed
the powerlessness of central banks to peg interest
rates. This is especially evident in the work of Hume,
Smith, Thornton, Ricardo, and Mill-all of whom
saw the interest rate as a real variable immune to
monetary manipulation.
David Hume (1711-1776)
Hume was the earliest British classical economist
to present the essentials of the proposition that inter-
est rates are immune to monetary control. He argued
(1) that the equilibrium rate is a real rather than a
monetary magnitude, (2) that one-time monetary
injections may temporarily lower the market rate
below its equilibrium level, (3) that the same mone-
tary injections will raise prices, and (4) that the re-
sulting price increases, via their effect on loan de-
mands, will reverse the fall in the market rate and
restore it to its initial level, thereby frustrating all
attempts at interest rate control.
Regarding the first point, he declared that the equi-
librium real interest rate is invariant with respect to
the size of the money stock. “It is in vain,” he said,
“to look for the cause of the [permanent] fall or rise
of interest in the greater or less quantity of gold and
silver” in circulation. [6, pp. 48-9] Monetary ex-
pansion, he said, does not alter the real characteristics
of the economy. It affects neither capital’s produc-
tivity nor society’s rate of time preference; therefore
it has no effect on the equilibrium rate. It merely
inflates equiproportionally both the equilibrium nomi-
nal return to capital and the money value of capital
itself, leaving their ratio-the rate of profit and hence
the equilibrium rate of interest-undisturbed.
Money having chiefly a fictitious [i.e., nominal]
value, the greater or less plenty of it is of no
consequence . . . . The same interest, in all cases,
bears the same proportion to the [capital] sum.
And if you lent me so much labour and so many
commodities; by receiving five per cent, you always
receive proportional labour and commodities, how-
ever represented . . . [6, p. 48]
It follows that “the rate of interest . . . is not derived
from the quantity” of money but rather from the real
forces of productivity and thrift. Thus, if we
. . . suppose, that, by miracle every man in Great
Britain should have five pounds slipt into his
pocket in one night; this would much more than
double the whole money that is at present in the
kingdom; yet there would not . . . be . . . any vari-
ation in the interest . . . . That [i.e., a fall in
interest] depends upon another principle; and must
proceed from an encrease of industry and frugality,
of arts and commerce. [6. p. 51]
Having described the invariance of the interest rate
with respect to monetary changes after all adjust-
ments have occurred, Hume then described its be-
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respect to the self-correcting mechanism that restores
market rates to equilibrium after a monetary shock,
he argued as follows: New money typically enters
the circulation by way of loan. The resulting expan-
sion of loan supply relative to loan demand tempo-
rarily lowers market rates. But the new money also
puts upward pressure on prices. And since with
rising prices more loans are needed to finance the
same level of real activity, it follows that loan de-
mands rise. The rise in loan demands reverses the
initial fall in market rates and restores them to their
preexisting levels thereby frustrating attempts to keep
them low. That is, assuming that the new money is
initially concentrated in the hands of lenders,
The encrease of lenders above the borrowers sinks
the interest; and so much the faster, if those, who
have acquired those large sums, find . . . no method
of employing their money but by lending it at
interest. But after this new mass of gold and
silver has been digested, and has circulated through
the whole state, affairs will soon return to their
former situation . . . . The whole money may still be
in the state, and make itself felt by the encrease of
prices: But . . . [the resulting rise in loan demand
ensures that] the disproportion between the bor-
rowers and lenders is the same as formerly, and
consequently the high interest returns. [6, p. 58]
It follows that expansionary monetary policy would
have no lasting effect on interest rates.
Adam Smith ( 1723-l 790)
Like Hume, Smith was instrumental in establishing
some key components of the proposition that central
banks cannot control interest rates. These compo-
nents included (1) the concept of the interest rate
as a real variable determined by productivity and
thrift, (2) the notion that the equilibrium interest
rate reflects the real profit rate on capital and not the
abundance or scarcity of money, and (3) an explicit
denial that money growth lowers interest rates.
David Ricardo summarized Smith’s views succinctly.
It has been shewn incontrovertibly by that able
Writer, Dr. Adam Smith, that the rate of interest
for money is regulated by the rate of profits on
that part of capital only which does not consist of
circulating medium, and that those profits are not
regulated but are wholly independent of the greater
or lesser quantity of money which may be employed
for the purposes of circulation; that the increase of
circulating medium will increase the prices of all
commodities, but will not lower the rate of interest.
[15, pp. 25-6, quoted in 5, p. 105]
In support of the proposition that money growth does
not affect interest rates, Smith, according to Ricardo,
noted “that the discovery of the mines in America,
which so greatly increased the quantity of money, did
not lessen the interest for the use of it; the rate of
interest being regulated by the profits on the employ-
ment of capital,” and not by the quantity of money
“used to circulate its produce.” [17, p. 33]
Henry Thornton ( 1760-l 815)
The next economist to be considered is Henry
Thornton, the greatest of all classical monetary the-
orists, whose work unfortunately is not well-known.
He made seminal contributions to the theory of the
lender of last resort, to the analysis of velocity and
the demand for money, to the theory of the trans-
mission mechanism linking money to nominal income,
to the Fisherine distinction between real and nominal
interest rates, to the purchasing power parity theory
of exchange rates, to the monetary approach to bal-
ance of payments and exchange rate analysis, to the
classical theory of international transfers, and to the
monetarist criticism of the real bills doctrine. Most
important, he constructed the basic analytical model
used by classical and neoclassical economists to
demonstrate the futility of  policies aimed at interest
rate control.
His model consisted of three elements. First was
the distinction between the market (loan) rate of in-
terest and the expected rate of profit on new capital
investment-this latter rate defined as the equilib-
rium to which the loan rate tends to conform. Second
was a loanable funds theory of interest rates accord-
ing to which the market rate is determined by loan
demand and supply. Of these two determinants,
Thornton defined loan demand as the nominal value
of capital goods financed by borrowing and loan
supply as the sum of saving plus new money issued
by way of loan. A monetary expansion, he noted,
would increase loan supply and temporarily lower the
market rate. The third element of Thornton’s model
was an adjustment mechanism that worked to restore
the market rate to its equilibrium level following a
monetary shock. Consisting of a causal chain running
from money to prices to loan demand to market rates,
this mechanism, he argued, acts to reverse inter-
est rate movements caused by changes in the mone-
tary component of loan supply. Using his model,
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tween the two rates owing to increases in the money
supply would be short-lived: such divergences would
automatically set in motion a process of rising prices
and increasing loan demands that would bid the loan
rate into equality with the equilibrium rate, thereby
frustrating all attempts at pegging.
Having applied his model to the problem of interest
rate control, Thornton mentioned two points largely
overlooked by his predecessors. First, he noted that
the interest-adjustment mechanism presupposes a
metallic monetary system in which gold reserve re-
quirements and convertibility constraints exist to
limit money growth. These constraints ensure that
loan demands overtake loan supplies so that the mar-
ket rate returns to its equilibrium level. He noted,
however, that no such constraints exist in inconvert-
ible paper regimes. Consequently money, and hence
loan supplies, could expand without limit to accom-
modate loan demands at all rates below the equilib-
rium profit rate. Given the unlimited elasticity of
loan supply, loan demand increases cannot bid up
market rates. Therefore, permanent pegging is theo-
retically possible in this latter case.
While conceding the possibility of pegging under
inconvertible paper, Thornton considered it unlikely.
Such pegging, he noted, would be accomplished at
the cost of ever-rising prices. Assuming the authori-
ties would find this cost intolerable, they would
abandon pegging and allow market rates to seek their
natural levels. In this case the responsibility for
avoiding inflation would provide the constraint neces-
sary for the working of the interest-adjustment
mechanism.
Thornton’s second point was that interest control
policies could be successful if a lowering of the mar-
ket rate induced a corresponding permanent reduction
of the equilibrium profit rate. Here was the first
mention of the forced saving doctrine. As stated by
Thornton, this doctrine holds that inflationary mone-
tary policy can, because of a lag in the adjustment of
wages to prices, redistribute income from labor to
capital. Assuming capitalists’ propensity to save and
invest is higher than workers’, this redistribution
stimulates capital formation and lowers the marginal
productivity of capital and thus the equilibrium rate
of interest to the desired market rate. Having
stated this doctrine, however, Thornton paid it little
attention. He saw it as a trivial exception to the rule
that central banks cannot affect interest rates.
David Ricardo ( 1772-l 823)
Whereas Thornton acknowledged the theoretical
possibility of interest-rate pegging in the inconvertible
paper and forced saving cases, Ricardo categorically
denied that the central bank could permanently con-
trol market rates under any circumstances. He said:
I believe . . . that no amount of loans which the
Bank might make, and no degree of lowness of
interest at which it might choose to lend, would
alter the permanent rate of interest in the market.
Interest  is regulated chiefly by the profits that
may be made by the use of capital; it cannot be
controlled by any bank [including the central
bank], nor by any assemblage of banks. [17, p.
280]
He was even more emphatic on this point in his
Principles of Political Economy and Taxation
(1819):
. . . the interest for money . . . is not regulated by
the rate at which the Bank will lend, whether it be
5, 4, or 3 per cent, but by the rate of profit which
can be made by the employment of capital, and
which is totally independent of the quantity, or of
the value of money. Whether a Bank lent one
million, ten millions, or a hundred million, they
would not permanently alter the market rate of
interest; they would alter only the value [i.e., pur-
chasing power] of the money which they thus
issued. [14, pp. 363-64]
He reached this conclusion via the following route:
The rate of interest is determined by the abundance
or scarcity of  real  capital. Money is not real capital.
Hence its quantity cannot affect the interest rate. As
he put it in his famous essay on “The High Price of
Bullion and Depreciation of Bank Notes” (1811) :
. . . the rate of interest is not regulated by the
abundance or scarcity of money, but by the abund-
ance or scarcity of that part of capital not consist-
ing of money . . . . As the increase of bank notes
does not add to this species of capital . . . it cannot
. . . lower interest. [17, pp. 32, 36]
He conceded, however, that the central bank could
temporarily depress interest rates: But he stressed
the transcience of this effect : no central bank, despite
its best efforts, could prevent rates from eventually
returning to their real equilibrium levels. Said he:
I do not dispute, that if the Bank were to bring a
large additional sum of notes into the market, and
offer them on loan, but that they would for a time
affect the rate of interest . . . . but having done so
. . . the notes . . . would [not] be retained unem-
ployed by the borrowers; they would be sent into
every market, and would everywhere raise the
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general circulation. It is only during the interval
of the issues of the Bank, and their effect on prices,
that we should be sensible of an abundance of
money; interest would, during that interval, be
under its natural level ; but as soon as the addi-
tional sum of notes . . . became absorbed in the
general circulation, the rate of interest would be
high, and new loans would be demanded with as
much eagerness as before the additional issues.
[17, p. 35]
In short,
Reduction or Increase of the Quantity of Money
always ultimately raises or lowers the Price of
Commodities; when this is effected, the Rate of
Interest will be precisely the same as before; it is
only during the Interval, that is, before the Prices
are settled at the new Rate, that the Rate of
Interest is either raised or lowered. [16, p. 445
quoted in 5, p. 481, n. 17]
Finally, he ridiculed the notion that the central
bank can peg interest rates at arbitrarily low levels.
To suppose that any increased issues of the Bank
can have the effect of permanently lowering the
rate of interest . . . is to attribute a power to the
circulating medium which it can never possess.
Banks would, if this were possible, become powerful
engines indeed. By creating paper money, and
lending it at three or two per cent under the
present market rate of interest, the Bank would
reduce the profits on trade in the same proportion;
and if they were sufficiently patriotic to lend their
notes at an interest no higher than necessary to
pay the expenses of their establishment, profits
would be still further reduced; no nation, but by
similar means, could enter into competition with us,
we should engross the trade of the world. To what
absurdities would not such a theory lead us!
Profits can only be lowered by a competition of
capitals not consisting of circulating medium. As
the increase of bank notes does not add to this
species of capital, as it neither increases our ex-
portable commodities, our machinery, or our raw
materials, it cannot add to our profits nor lower
interest. [17, pp. 35-6]
John Stuart Mill (1806-1873)
The last classical economist to be considered is
J. S. Mill. His opinion of the central bank’s ability
to control interest rates via changes in the money
stock is summarized in the following passage:
The rate of interest, then, depends essentially and
permanently on the comparative amount of real
capital offered and demanded in the way of loan;
but is subject to temporary disturbances of various
sorts from increase and diminution of the circu-
lating medium . . . [9, p. 647]
In other words, the central bank can exercise a tem-
porary
3 but not a permanent influence on interest
rates since in the final analysis those rates are deter-
mined by real forces.
[H]ow great an error, then, it is to imagine that
the rate of interest bears any necessary relation
to the quantity or value of money in circulation.
An increase of the currency has in itself no [per-
manent] effect, and is incapable of having any
such effect, on the rate of interest . . . . It dimin-
ishes indeed the power of money to buy commodi-
ties, but not the power of money to buy money [i.e.,
to command an unchanged rate of interest].  [10,
p. 210]
Mill recognized only one exception-the forced
saving case-to the rule that central banks cannot
control interest rates. Like Thornton, he admitted
that an inflation-induced redistribution of real pur-
chasing power from workers to capitalists would
permit income to be “converted into capital : and
thus, strange as it may appear, the depreciation of the
currency, when effected in this way, operates to a
certain extent as a forced accumulation” that lowers
equilibrium rates. [11, p. 118] But he thought this
case to be practically unimportant, ranking it among
the “anomalies in the rate of interest, which have not
been hitherto brought within the pale of exact
science.” [11, p. 114]
In short, Mill’s position was much the same as
Thornton’s. Like Thornton, he believed that, except
for the forced saving case, the central bank is largely
powerless to maintain market interest rates at any
arbitrary level and that its attempts to do so would
merely raise prices. This was on the grounds that
the equilibrium rate of interest is predominantly a
real (nonmonetary) phenomenon determined by pro-
ductivity and thrift. As such, it is invariant with
respect to monetary expansion engineered by the
central bank. Thus any attempt to hold market rates
below that real equilibrium level via expansionary
monetary policy would simply produce a rise in
prices and a consequent increase in the demand for
3 Mill was quite explicit regarding these transitory effects.
A monetary expansion, he noted, can temporarily lower
market yields.
An increase . . . of currency issued by banks, tends,
while the process continues, to bring down or to
keep down the rate of interest. [9, p. 647]
But once the expansion ends (as it must if the authority
is to honor its obligation to maintain convertibility and/or
price stability) the rate of interest returns to its original
level. There it
. . . bears no . . . relation to the quantity . . . of
the money in circulation. The permanent amount of
the circulating medium, whether great or small,
affects only prices; not the rate of interest. [9, p.
645]
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would force the market rate back to its initial equilib-
rium level. As viewed by Mill, this rate-equilibrating
mechanism would always work provided there existed
some absolute constraint (e.g., positive cash reserve
ratios, the monetary authority’s unwillingness to
tolerate inflation forever) on the money stock. Given
these conditions, he held that interest pegging was
impossible-the essence of the classical view.
Bankers’ Opinion
The foregoing classical view was not confined to
the classical economists themselves. It was also held
by influential 19th century British bankers, whose
views carried greater weight in financial circles than
those of the economists of the time. A prime example
is James Morris who, according to Elmer Wood in
his scholarly  English Theories of Central Banking
Control, 1819-1858,  contended that the central bank
“can never keep interest rates unnaturally low for
any length of time.” [21, p. 138] The same opinion
was voiced by William Cotton who, according to
Wood, held that the market rate in any nation “is
regulated by the general rate all over the world” such
that “if the [Central] Bank were to keep the rate
unnaturally low the pressure on it would soon become
so great as to require it to raise the rate.” [21, p.
138] Even more emphatic was Samuel Jones Loyd
(Lord Overstone) who declared that the directors of
the “Bank of England have no more power of raising
the rate of discount than you or I have; they must
conform” to the rate dictated by real forces. [quoted
in 21, p. 139] Perhaps the strongest statement of
the central bank’s impotence in regard to interest rate
control came from J. G. Hubbard (Lord Addington).
Said he, “I must confess my amazement at finding
people censure or praise the Bank for making the
rate of interest high or low, when the Bank has no
possible power to make it the one or the other.”
[quoted in 21, p. 139] These quotations indicate
that the classical view was not restricted to an eso-
teric circle of academic scholars but rather had
achieved a wider recognition by the middle of the
19th century.
Neoclassical Views
Given the widespread acceptance of the classical
view, it is hardly surprising to find it repeated in the
neoclassical ( 1870-1936) monetary literature. In-
deed, it is a central theme of the writings of such
well-known neoclassical theorists as Eugen von
Bohm-Bawerk, Knut Wicksell, Alfred Marshall,
Irving Fisher, and Arthur C. Pigou. Like their
classical predecessors, these writers contended that
the equilibrium rate is a real magnitude to which the
market rate normally conforms; that a discrepancy
between the two rates will result in a cumulative rise
in prices; and that this price increase itself will
eliminate the rate disparity by raising loan demands
and/or reducing loan supplies, thereby bidding the
market rate into equilibrium. The first neoclassical
to employ these propositions in a demonstration of
the futility of interest-pegging policies was Bohm-
Bawerk.
Eugen von Bohm-Bawerk (1851-1914)
Eugen von Bohm-Bawerk, the celebrated Austrian
capital theorist and co-founder of the Austrian School
of economics, enunciated the neoclassical concept of
the interest rate as a real phenomenon immune to
monetary control. Said he:
The level of the  interest rate prevailing in a
country does not in the long run depend on whether
that country has a large volume of coins or other
types of money, but on whether it is rich in real
capital, in stored-up products available for produc-
tive investment or for lending. [1, quoted in 7,
p. 129]
He admitted, however, that, because monetary injec-
tions enter the system via bank loan expansions,
. . . the stock of money, taking this term quite
literally, does exert a certain [temporary] influence
on the movements of the interest rate-an influ-
ence which, although not profound, is very conspic-
uous and therefore often overestimated, especially
by the layman. [1, quoted in 7, p. 129]
But he insisted that this influence would be short-
lived owing to the effect of money on prices and
prices on loan demands. In his words:
. . . the excess quantity of money, to the extent that
it pours into the channels of the commodity mar-
kets, will in a well-known fashion reduce the pur-
chasing power of money. Money prices of all
commodities-and, thus, prices of real capital goods
-will rise; and ultimately more units of money
than previously will be required to transfer the
same amount of real capital goods. Once matters
have come to this point, the increased supply of
money which initially pressed on the market as
excess supply will be completely absorbed by the
demand for money capital which rises for the above
reason. Eventually the disturbed equilibrium be-
tween supply and demand will be restored, and the
normal interest rate corresponding to the actual
supply of real capital will also be re-established.
[1, quoted in 7, pp. 129-30]
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view: the distinction between equilibrium and mar-
ket rates, the notion of the former as a real magnitude
to which the latter eventually conforms, and the con-
cept of price-induced shifts in loan demand as the
equilibrating mechanism that frustrates attempts at
interest rate control.
Alfred Marshall (1642-1924)
The foregoing ideas were likewise employed by
Alfred Marshall. He concluded that interest rates are
independent of the money supply and are therefore
resistant to monetary control. More precisely, he
contended that the average rate on short-term loans
(“the rate of discount”) is governed by the average
rate on long-term loans which in turn is determined
by the profit rate on capital. Since the profit rate
itself is determined by the real forces of productivity
and thrift, it follows that
. . . the supply of gold [and by implication the
stock of paper money as well] exercises no perma-
nent influence over the rate of discount. The
average rate of discount permanently is determined
by the profitableness of business. All that the
influx of gold does is to make a sort of ripple on
the surface of the water. The average rate of
discount is determined by the average level of
interest in my opinion, and that is determined
exclusively by the profitableness of business, gold
and silver merely acting as counters with regard
to it. [8, p. 41]
In line with this reasoning, he concluded that cur-
rency injections cannot keep interest rates low. For
although
. . . the increase of currency goes . . . to the banking
centres; and, therefore, it increases the willingness
of lenders to lend in the first instance, and lowers
discount . . . it afterwards raises prices, and,
therefore, tends to increase discount. This latter
movement is cumulative  . . . . Thus, a fall in the
purchasing power of money tends, after a while, to
raise the rate of discount as well as the rate of
interest on long investments. [8, p. 274]
That is, while increases in the money stock  can ini-
tially lower market rates and cause them to deviate
from the equilibrium rate, such deviations are inher-
ently short-lived. For the resulting cumulative rise in
prices and loan demands will invariably restore mar-
ket rates to their original levels. Since money-
induced falls in interest rates are self-reversing in
character, it follows that rate-pegging policies will
be ineffective.
Irving Fisher ( 1867-l 947)
Irving Fisher, the celebrated American quantity
theorist, monetary reformer, and pioneer econometri-
cian, shared Marshall’s views on interest rate control.
Like Marshall, he denounced the notion that expan-
sionary monetary policy permanently lowers market
rates. This notion, he said,
. . . is fallacious, and the fallacy consists in for-
getting that plentiful money [by raising prices and
thus the loan requirements of borrowers] ulti-
mately raises the demand for loans just as much
as it raises the supply, and therefore has just as
much tendency to raise interest as to lower it. [3,
p. 356]
In short, falls in the interest rate caused by monetary
expansion are inherently self-reversing because
The inflation of the currency [raises prices and so
the need for borrowing and thus] pulls interest up
on the [loan] demand side as hard as it pulls it
down on the supply side. [3, pp. 357-58]
The result is an equiproportional rise in loan demand
and supply that leaves the interest rate unchanged.
To illustrate, he presented a hypothetical example
of a doubling of the money stock in which the follow-
ing sequence occurs : First, the new money enters the
economy through’ the loan market, thereby doubling
the supply of loans and lowering interest rates. The
new money is then spent on the fixed full capacity
level of real output, thereby doubling prices. Faced
with rising prices, businessmen require double the
amount of loans just to finance the same level of real
activity.  The result is a doubling of the demand for
loans that puts upward pressure on interest rates.
Noting that the increased loan demand reverses the
interest-depressing effect of the initial doubling of
loan supply, Fisher concluded that
. . . in the end, doubling the amount of money will
not affect the rate of interest. It will simply affect
the amount of money lent and borrowed. [3, p. 357]
He also noted that this conclusion, namely “that an
inflation of the currency does not affect the rate of
interest,” [3, p. 359] strictly holds for one-time but
not continuous increases in the money stock. For if
the inflationary increase is continuous, it will come
to be expected and these expectations will be incor-
porated into nominal rates. In this case, the mone-
tary authority, far from keeping nominal interest
rates low, cannot prevent them from exceeding their
original level.
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Like Marshall and Fisher, Knut Wicksell asked if
there exist “limits . . . which restrict the power of the
[central] banks” to peg market rates below their real
equilibrium levels. [19, p. 111 quoted in 12, p. 591]
Like them he answered in the affirmative. But
whereas they appealed to the effect of money-induced
price increases on loan demands to explain the futility
of interest-pegging policies, he stressed the impact of
prices on metallic reserves. More precisely, he argued
that the price increases generated when loan rates
are arbitrarily held below their natural (equilibrium)
levels would, in a metallic monetary system, precipi-
tate internal drains of gold into hand-to-hand circu-
lation, thereby diminishing bank reserves. Said he,
“where there are no [bank] notes of small denomina-
tion and where metallic money is used in business,
then on this assumption [of the continuous rise in
prices] the increased demand for gold for internal
business would soon empty the bank’s vaults.” [20,
p. 189 quoted in 12, p. 591] To protect their reserves
from depletion, banks (including the central bank)
raise their loan rates, or what is the same thing,
contract their loan supply. Either way, rates return
to their natural equilibrium levels, contrary to at-
tempts to peg them. In this manner, the need to
maintain gold reserves limits the central bank’s influ-
ence over interest rates.
Wicksell of course acknowledged that the gold
reserve constraint would not exist in an inconvertible
paper regime. In this case, the authority theoretically
would be free to peg rates via unlimited money
growth. But he contended that in these circumstances
another constraint would rule, namely the obligation
to maintain price stability. Faced with this responsi-
bility, the authority would be forced to abandon peg-
ging and let interest rates gravitate to their natural
equilibrium levels.
Wicksell also acknowledged the forced saving ex-
ception discussed earlier in this article. That is, he
conceded that pegging would work provided inflation
itself generated, via the forced saving route, sufficient
capital formation to lower the marginal productivity
of capital and thus the natural rate of interest to the
target loan rate.
Arthur Cecil Pigou (1877-1959)
Undoubtedly the clearest statement of the proposi-
tion that central banks cannot control interest rates
came from the Cambridge economist, A. C. Pigou.
According to Pigou, that proposition asserts (1) that
real factors determine the equilibrium rate on long-
term loans, (2) that interest arbitrage ensures that
this long-term rate governs all short-term rates
including the central bank’s discount rate, and (3)
that this means that even the discount rate is deter-
mined by conditions outside the central bank’s con-
trol.
The rate of discount is tied up to the rate of
interestmoney rate-on long loans; this rate, it is
argued, is determined by the general conditions of
demand and supply of real capital; these lie outside
the Central or any other bank’s control; and,
therefore, though, no doubt, on occasions for a little
while a strong Central Bank could hold its discount
rate above or below the rate for long loans (with
due allowance for differences of risk), attempts to
do this for any length of time must lead to a
transfer of borrowings between the long and short
loan markets, and so defeat itself. Hence, it is
argued, the Central Bank, despite its apparent
autonomy, is in fact merely a medium through
which forces wholly external to it work their will.
Though, that is to say, in determining the discount
rate, the voice is the voice of the bank, the hands
are not its hands. [13, p. 251]
This of course is not to deny that the central bank
can temporarily lower the discount rate below’ its
equilibrium level. But it does mean that the resulting
inflationary rise in money, prices, loan demands, and
nominal long-term yields will compel the central bank
to reverse the rate reduction. It therefore follows
that
. . . if the money rate of discount is altered at the
volition of the banks, just those associated changes
which have been described . . . must take place,
and must be carried to the point at which the real
rate of discount is equated (with the proper allow-
ances) to the real rate of interest on long loans;
this real rate being throughout determined by con-
ditions outside the bankers’ control. [13, p. 253]
In the final analysis, then, the central bank has no
choice but to let the discount rate conform to the
equilibrium rate. Pigou saw but one exception to
this rule, namely the forced saving case.
Milton Friedman
The classical/neoclassical notion of the inability of
the central bank to exercise permanent control over
interest rates persists today in the work of Milton
Friedman. The monetary authority, he says, “can-
not peg interest rates for more than very limited
periods.” [4, p. 5] To show why this is so, he
FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF RICHMOND 19distinguishes between the first-round “liquidity” or
“portfolio” effect of money growth on interest rates
and the subsequent “income and price level” and
“price expectation” effects. The liquidity effect refers
to the initial fall in interest rates caused by the mone-
tary expansion. This expansion generates an excess
supply of money which people attempt to eliminate
by purchasing securities, thereby bidding up their
prices and lowering their yields. The income and
price level effects refer to the expansionary influence
of money growth on prices and nominal income,
which tend to reverse the initial decline in interest
rates. These two effects, of course, correspond to the
interest-lowering loan supply and interest-raising
loan demand effects stressed by the classical/neo-
classical school. Finally, Friedman’s price expecta-
tions effect refers to the premium for expected
inflation that gets incorporated into nominal rates
and raises them above their initial level. Taken
together, these effects ensure that real rates inevitably
return to their equilibrium levels, regardless of the
actions of the monetary authority. Together, they
“explain why monetary policy cannot peg interest
rates.” [4, p. 7]
Concluding Comments
This article has sampled the opinion of leading
classical and neoclassical monetary theorists regard-
ing the central bank’s inability to permanently peg
interest rates. In so doing the article has no doubt
overlooked other economists who held similar views.
For example, nothing was said about Gustav Cassel,
who argued that a central bank faced with the respon-
sibility for monetary and price level stability has no
choice but to set the bank rate at the exogenously
given equilibrium (natural) rate.
Nevertheless, the evidence presented is sufficient
to provide strong support for the main contention of
the article, namely that a central theme of the classical
and neoclassical monetary literature was that the
central bank is largely powerless to peg interest rates
and that its attempts to do so would merely change
the level of prices. Of course the mere dominance
of this view throughout 200 years of mainstream
monetary theorizing does not establish its validity.
But it does raise questions about the origins of the
opposing interest-pegging view. For whatever else
one may say about that alternative view, one cannot
claim that it derives from the economists quoted
above. In short, proponents of interest-pegging poli-
cies cannot draw support from the mainstream mone-
tary tradition established by classical and neoclassical
writers. On the contrary, interest-pegging policies
are incompatible with this tradition.
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